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Abstract  In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that enriches the literature on 
the pros and cons of ownership unbundling vis-à-vis lighter unbundling frameworks 
in the natural gas markets. For each regulatory framework, we compute equilibrium 
outcomes when an incumbent firm and a new entrant compete à la Cournot in the 
final gas market. We find that the entrant’s contracting conditions in the upstream 
market and the transmission tariff are key determinants of the market structure in 
the downstream gas market (both with ownership and with legal unbundling). We 
also study how the regulator must optimally set transmission tariffs in each of the 
two unbundling regimes. We conclude that welfare maximizing tariffs often require 
free access to the transmission network (in both regulatoy regimes). However, when 
the regulator aims at promoting the break-even of the regulated transmission system 
operator, the first-best tariff is unfeasible in both regimes. Hence, we study a more 
realistic set-up, in which the regulator’s action is constrained by the break-even of 
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a given transmission tariff, final prices in the downstream market are always higher 
with ownership unbundling than with legal unbundling. 
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